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THE GIST OF THE PROBLEM  
Insurance fraud involves deception either during the application for insurance or when 
a claim is made under a policy. At the application stage the party seeking insurance 
may falsify, or fail to disclose, information in order to obtain cover, reduce the 
premium, or alter the terms on which cover is offered. This paper is primarily 
concerned with fraudulent claims. A fraudulent claim on an insurance policy 
encompasses (a) a claim for a loss that was never incurred (either the entire claim is 
false or there are invented losses alongside genuine losses)1 and (b) a claim that 
exaggerates the amount lost. A fraudulent device is where a genuine claim is 
supported by fraudulent evidence which conceals the fact that the insurer has a 
defence to the claim or otherwise improves the insured’s prospects of obtaining 
recovery. The law is, however, far from straightforward.  What state of knowledge 
renders a claim fraudulent? Should fraudulent claims and the use of fraudulent 
devices be treated in the same way? What is the consequence of the fraud for genuine 
aspects of the claim, for the future of the policy and, indeed, for previous, legitimate 
claims? What if a third party, who is exercising a statutory right to sue a liability 
insurer, perpetrates the fraud? And, is fraud by policyholders the whole story or does 
it distort proper discussion of claims? 
 
Insurers have long complained, in the strongest of terms, about the problem of 
fraud,2 reporting that the cost to the industry and, therefore, to policyholders is 
enormous.3 The Association of British Insurers stated that fraud adds an average of 
£50 to every policyholder’s premium and that in 2013 insurers uncovered more than 
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118,500 fraudulent claims totalling £1.3 billion.4 This has brought various responses, 
including the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department in 2012, a unit within the 
City of London Police funded by the industry, the Insurance Fraud Bureau and the 
Insurance Fraud Register, which were set up by the industry, and the Insurance Fraud 
Taskforce, established in 2014 by Chris Grayling, the Justice Secretary.5 In the civil 
courts, the judges have expressed disapproval of insurance fraud in strong terms: “The 
making of dishonest insurance claims has become all too common. There seems to be 
a widespread belief that insurance companies are fair game, and that defrauding them 
is not morally reprehensible.”6 As well as encouraging prosecutions,7 the judges have 
taken the view that the civil courts can play a role in deterring fraud. Arden L.J. 
remarked that, “A civil law sanction, particularly a financial one, made in an 
appropriate case may be more effective than a criminal sanction or other sanction.”8 
The civil courts have, therefore, developed the fraudulent claims rule under which the 
insured loses the entire claim, including any genuine part, largely irrespective of the 
materiality of the fraud or whether the insurer was deceived.9 
 
The fraudulent claim rule is confined to insurance law because the duty of 
utmost good faith arises only between parties to the insurance contract. That means a 
claimant, including someone who brings an action against the tortfeasor’s liability 
insurer under a statutory right, does not lose the right to damages for genuine injuries 
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even if at first the extent of the injuries was dishonestly exaggerated.10 In Shah v Ul-
Haq,11 S negligently drove into W’s car. W and his wife brought a claim for genuine 
injuries they had suffered, and K, who was alleged to have been a passenger, also 
brought a claim. But K had not been in the car at the time and it was alleged that W 
had encouraged the fraud. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the fraudulent claim 
rule was applicable only to insurance, which meant W’s own claim was unaffected by 
any fraud W committed in respect of K’s claim.12  
  
Aside from whether law is particularly good at deterring such behaviour, 
which it probably is not,13 and whether the civil courts are designed to punish 
behaviour, which they are not, there has been criticism of the inflexible nature of the 
fraudulent claim rule.14 The Law Commissions endorsed the rationale behind the 
approach taken by the courts: “It is important for the law to set out clear sanctions to 
deter policyholders from acting fraudulently.”15 Yet, at the same time, they thought 
the existing law “convoluted and confused”, and wanted “remedies to insurers which 
are principled, proportionate and reliable.”16 In a similar vein, Popplewell J., at first 
instance in Versloot Dredging BV v HDI-Gerling Industrie Versicherung, (The DC 
Merwestone),17 thought the rules “capable of operating to visit disproportionately 
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harsh and unjust consequences upon an assured in favour of an undeserving 
insurer.”18 As will be seen, the Court of Appeal did not share these views.19  
  
The fraudulent claim rule 
What constitutes fraud? The classic definition, formulated over a century ago, is that 
there is fraud where one party, for our purposes the insured, makes a material 
statement knowing it is false, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, not caring if 
it is true or false. The conduct must be dishonest by the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people and the policyholder must have realised that by those 
standards his or her conduct was dishonest.20 Carelessness alone is insufficient,21 but 
there is no need to show an intention to cause harm.22 A statement that the insured 
believes to be true when made may become fraudulent if the insured later discovers it 
is false and does not correct it.23  Moreover, there may be fraud where the 
policyholder deliberately withholds information that would give the insurer a defence 
against a claim.24 The effect of the allegation on the evidence required was explained 
by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead:  
 
“this does not mean that where a serious allegation is in issue the standard of 
proof required is higher. It means only that the inherent probability or 
improbability of an event is itself a matter to be taken into account when 
weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event 
occurred. The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence 
that it did occur before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be  
established.”25  
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The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) requires the insurer to provide clear 
evidence of lies, inconsistency or deception: “The fact that members of an insurance 
firm’s staff are personally satisfied of the claimant’s bad faith is not sufficient proof 
of dishonesty.”26 It is worth emphasising that none of this means the insured has a 
duty of disclosure analogous to that arising in the pre-contractual period, and the fact 
that the insured has failed to disclose all the documents the insurer might have wished 
to see does not necessarily mean there has been fraud.  
 
The consequence of this view of what constitutes fraud is that the insured 
forfeits the entire claim, including any genuine parts, irrespective of whether the 
insurer was deceived.27 One might add that a policyholder, whose claim has been 
rejected for fraud, is likely to find it impossible to obtain insurance in the future, 
irrespective of whether criminal charges have been brought or a civil court has ruled 
on the issue. The devastation that this rule might visit upon an insured will be 
sufficiently clear to require only one example. In Aviva Insurance Ltd v Brown,28 the 
insured received a payment for a claim following subsidence at his property. This 
comprised £176,951.68 for repairs that were carried out and £58,500 for alternative 
accommodation. The court required the reimbursement of the insurer when it was 
discovered that the insured had engaged in fraudulent conduct in earlier seeking 
payment for accommodation which he owned (albeit through his own letting 
company), even though he decided not to move into it and did not receive any 
payment in relation to that accommodation. The reimbursement of the cost of repairs 
and the accommodation, which were genuinely incurred, were forfeited because they 
arose from the same claim. 
 
While a claim for an item that the policyholder knows has not been lost is 
obviously fraudulent, there is also fraud if the item has been lost but its value has been 
exaggerated In Goulstone v Royal Insurance Co,29 the policyholder had stated that his 
goods were worth £50 when he was declared insolvent in 1854, but after fire 
destroyed those goods (his suggestion as to its cause was “the cat had played with 
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lucifers [matches]”), he claimed £200, even though admitting that he had not added to 
the stock. The claim failed after Pollock CB directed the jury to determine “whether 
[the claim] was false in any substantial respect”.30 Exaggeration is not, however, 
necessarily evidence of fraud. In Ewer v National Employers’ Mutual General 
Insurance Association,31 the contents of business premises were destroyed and the 
policyholder put in a figure of £900 as their value. Although the judge thought this 
“looks preposterous”, in that it was well above the true value, he concluded there was 
no fraud because it was clear on the face of the claim that the figure had been based 
on the cost price of new items: “It was one of those cases where the view of the 
assured as to what he was entitled to, or would like to recover, for the things that had 
been burned or damaged differed very much from the view of the insurance company 
as to the amount the assured would eventually be entitled to recover.” The insured did 
not intend to defraud the company, but merely took the view that he was entitled to 
recover the cost of replacing the lost items. Although incorrect in law, it did not make 
his action fraudulent: “I do not think he was doing that as in any way a fraudulent 
claim, but as a possible figure to start off with, as a bargaining figure.”32 This 
approach has been endorsed more recently by Hoffmann L.J.: 
 
“One should naturally not readily infer fraud from the fact that the insured has 
made a doubtful or even exaggerated claim. In cases where nothing is 
misrepresented or concealed, and the loss adjuster is in as good a position to 
form a view of the validity or value of the claim as the insured, it will be a 
legitimate reason that the assured was merely putting forward a starting figure 
for negotiation.”33  
 
The issue of whether there was fraud is determined not by showing the claim was 
exaggerated but by the insurer demonstrating that the policyholder had the appropriate 
intention or recklessness, although gross exaggeration combined with other evidence 
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as to the implausibility of the claim may be sufficient.34 An honest belief in the 
accuracy of the claim should be sufficient to refute an allegation of fraud.35 
 
The fraud must be related to the claim, and it must be “substantially 
fraudulent”,36 or “fraudulent to a substantial extent.”37 Does this refer to the 
materiality of the fraud, or to the proportion that the fraudulent element bears to the 
whole claim? The judges disagreed on the point in Galloway v Guardian Royal 
Exchange (UK) Ltd.38 Following a burglary, the policyholder submitted a claim for 
£16,133.94, which appeared genuine, and £2,000 for a computer, which had not been 
stolen. Both judges subscribed to the need to deter fraud.  
 
“The rule which we are asked to enforce today may appear to some to be 
harsh, but it is in my opinion a necessary and salutary rule which deserves to 
be better known by the public. I for my part would be most unwilling to dilute 
it in any way.”39  
 
Yet, in a view that reflects the dilemma touched on by the Law Commissions, Lord 
Woolf MR looked at the fraud in the context of the whole claim and decided that 
because the fraud related to a substantial amount and was a significant percentage of 
the claim, the whole claim was tainted. Mustill L.J., disagreed. He looked at the 
fraudulent claim in isolation in order to consider whether it was “sufficiently serious 
to justify stigmatising it as a breach of his [the policyholder’s] duty of good faith so as 
to avoid the policy.”40 On this test, where one part is fraudulent, the whole claim fails, 
irrespective of the amounts involved. The issue of which approach is correct has not 
been entirely settled because, although later courts seem to have preferred the view of 
Mustill L.J., there has been some support for that of Lord Woolf.41  
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 Where the policy is in the name of two or more people, the fraud of one will 
be fatal to the claim of the other, innocent party in the case of joint insurance, but not 
composite insurance. The reason advanced for this distinction is that joint insurance is 
a single policy, while composite insurance comprises distinct contracts with each of 
the insureds. In General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd v Midland 
Bank Ltd,42 Sir Wilfrid Greene MR remarked: 
 
“That there can be a joint insurance by persons having a joint interest is, of 
course, manifest. If A and B are joint owners of property—and I use that 
phrase in the strict sense—an undertaking to indemnify them jointly is a true 
contract of indemnity in respect of a joint loss which they have jointly 
suffered. Again, there can be no objection to combining in one insurance a 
number of persons having different interests in the subject-matter of the 
insurance, but I find myself unable to see how an insurance of that character 
can be called a joint insurance. In such a case the interest of each of the 
insured is different. The amount of his loss, if the subject-matter of the 
insurance is destroyed or damaged, depends on the nature of his interest, and 
the covenant of indemnity which the policy gives must, in such a case, 
necessarily operate as a covenant to indemnify in respect of each individual 
different loss which the various persons named may suffer. In such a case 
there is no joint element at all.”43 
 
Two contrasting cases illustrate the effect of this distinction. In Direct Line Insurance 
plc v Khan,44 the insurance covered a house that was jointly owned by the 
policyholders and, following a fraud undertaken by Mr K without the knowledge of 
Mrs K, the court upheld the insurer’s decision not to pay either policyholder. Arden 
L.J. said that, “the defendants' insurance claims were actions which Mr Khan carried 
out partly on his own behalf and partly as agent for Mrs Khan within the scope of Mr 
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Lloyd’s Rep 262; [1998] CL.C. 1351 (composite; fraud in pre-contract disclosure). 
Khan's actual or apparent authority from Mrs Khan. Mrs Khan was, therefore, bound 
by the consequences of those fraudulent actions.”45 That case primarily turned on 
whether Mrs K was joint owner of the property or a tenant in common because the 
existence of different interests would have constituted a composite insurance. In 
Parker v NFU Mutual Insurance Society Ltd,46 BP owned the insured house and, after 
MP came to live with her, she added his name to the policy, even though he had no 
legal interest in the property. The court held that the interests covered by the policy 
were not joint but different because of MP’s lack of legal interest and, therefore, BP’s 
claim was not tainted by MP’s fraud or arson. It is worth adding that, even where the 
interests of A and B in the insured property are different, if A makes a fraudulent 
claim as agent of both parties, B’s claim would be tainted. Furthermore, having 
indemnified an innocent co-assured, the insurer may be able to exercise subrogation 
rights against any co-assured who had wrongfully caused the loss. 
  
One problem, as the Law Commissions recognised,47 is that spouses, who are 
joint insureds, may become estranged and one may act without considering the 
interest of the other – or, indeed, may act to spite the other. Their proposal to give 
protection to an innocent joint policyholder was dropped, however, in the face of 
concern that the courts might find it difficult to distinguish between cases where there 
had been complicity and those where there had not, or to value the interest of an 
innocent joint policyholder, although these objections seem curious since such 
judgments are part of the normal function of the courts. The fraudulent party might 
reap some benefit if the innocent party were able to claim, but this makes a general 
assumption about the nature of the relationship between all joint policyholders that 
does not stand much scrutiny, and it hardly seems a sufficient reason to punish the 
latter. Moreover, the principal reason for a special rule on fraudulent claims in 
insurance is to deter and it is difficult to see how this is achieved by punishing 
innocent parties. The Law Commissions did suggest that the issue of fraud might not 
arise because the claim by the innocent party would be defended on the basis of a 
policy term, which is typically included, to the effect that the insurer is not liable if 
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http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/ICL7_Insureds_Duty_of_Good_Faith.pdf  (last accessed 20 
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one of the joint policyholders has brought about the loss intentionally. But in such 
cases the issue is not whether the fraudulent claims rule applies, but whether the 
insurance contract covers the loss.  
  
Fraudulent devices 
A fraudulent device refers to the situation where the loss is genuine but some fraud is 
used to advance the claim or conceal some defence.48 It is said to be “a sub-species of 
making a fraudulent claim”,49 and, as such, is subject to the same consequences. The 
law in this area is, however, newly minted, arising out of Agapitos v Agnew (The 
Aegeon).50 Although that case was determined by applying the ruling in The Star Sea 
that the fraudulent claim rule did not apply where litigation had commenced, Mance 
L.J. took the opportunity to discuss the post-contractual duty of good faith. He set out 
by referring to “the opacity of the relevant principles” that “is matched only by the 
stringency of the sanctions assigned.” He went on to observe that, while the law on 
fraudulent claims was settled in the nineteenth century, “The proper approach to the 
use of fraudulent devices or means is much freer from authority.”51  
 
“Tentatively, I would suggest that the courts should only apply the fraudulent 
claim rule to the use of fraudulent devices or means which would, if believed, 
have tended, objectively but prior to any final determination at trial of the 
parties' rights, to yield a not insignificant improvement in the insured's 
prospects—whether they be prospects of obtaining a settlement, or a better 
settlement, or of winning at trial.”52 
 
He, therefore, combines the need for subjective intention (or recklessness) with an 
objective test of the impact of the lie, tested at the time it was made. The fraud must 
not be “unsubstantial” and it must “directly be related to and intended to promote the 
claim”.53 This has since been construed as establishing a two-stage test which requires 
                                                 
48 For example, a breach of warranty: US Trading Ltd v Axa Insurance Co. Ltd [2010] Lloyd’s Rep. 
I.R. 505. 
49 Agapitos v Agnew (“The Aegeon”) [2003] Q.B. 556 at 574, Mance L.J. 
50 Agapitos v Agnew (“The Aegeon”) [2003] Q.B. 556 at 574.  
51 Agapitos v Agnew (“The Aegeon”) [2003] Q.B. 556 at 574. 
52 Agapitos v Agnew (“The Aegeon”) [2003] Q.B. 556 at 575. 
53 Agapitos v Agnew (“The Aegeon”) [2003] Q.B. 556 at 572. The idea of materiality has not died 
easily: see N. Broomfield, “B.I.L.A. Colloquium: Insurance Fraud” (2014) 127 Journal of the British 
Insurance Law Association. 
the insurer to show: “(1) the use by the insured of some lie to seek to improve or 
embellish the facts surrounding the claim; and (2) that the lie would, if believed, have 
tended objectively to yield a not insignificant improvement in the insured's prospects 
of obtaining a settlement.”54  
 
There has been some division of opinion over whether it is necessary to show 
that the insurer relied on the fraud,55 but if the policy of the law is to deter fraud, then 
the insured’s success or failure in deceiving the insurer should be irrelevant. That was 
Mance L.J.’s view: “Does the fact that the lie happens to be detected or unravelled 
before a settlement or during a trial make it immaterial at the time when it was told? 
In my opinion, not.”56  Yet, FOS has taken a different view in that it looks at whether 
the document was used “solely to substantiate transactions that really took place, or 
did the customers intend to obtain more than they were entitled to?”57 This might 
seem to undermine the fraudulent device rule, which only applies if the claim is 
genuine, but, in practice, it reflects a more nuanced view in that FOS takes into 
account the nature of the fraud when determining whether the claim should be paid 
and the policy reinstated.58 Finally, it is noteworthy that the fraudulent device rule 
only applies to claims under the policy. Where the insured reaches a settlement of the 
claim with the insurer and the false document is used to obtain the agreed payment, 
the rule does not apply. 
 
THE REMEDY 
It is clear that the insured loses all benefits if the claim is fraudulent,59 but what is the 
effect of the fraud on other payments and on the policy? What happens to any interim 
payments made in relation to the relevant claim before the discovery of the fraud and 
any paid or unpaid claims that are not connected to the fraud? In Axa General 
                                                 
54 Sharon’s Bakery (Europe) Ltd v AXA Insurance UK Plc [2011] EWHC 210 (Comm) at [79]; [2012] 
Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 164, Blair J. 
55 Contrast Interpart Comerciao e Gestao S.A. v Lexington Insurance Co. [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 
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Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb,60 Mance L.J. reiterated his view that the fraudulent claims 
rule was a special common law rule under which the whole of the tainted claim was 
forfeited, but added that the fraud did not have retrospective effect and so legitimate 
claims were not affected. Interim payments made in relation to the fraudulent claim 
could, however, be claimed back by the insurer, even though the payments were made 
before the fraudulent device was deployed.   
 
Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 might seem to offer a clear 
answer to questions about the effect of fraud on the policy: “A contract of marine 
insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if the utmost good faith 
be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party.”61 
Fraud might strike one as a paradigm example of what constitutes a breach of good 
faith, so it is surprising to find that this is not the case – at least when it comes to 
claims fraud. The problem is that the remedy seems harsh since allowing the insurer 
to avoid the contract ab initio obliges the insured to repay previous payments relating 
to genuine claims unconnected with the fraud. It might plausibly be argued that, while 
the fraudulent claim rule is about post-contractual issues, s.17 is confined to the pre-
contractual period and acts a backstop to the specific obligations set out in the 
succeeding sections of the statute. Mackenzie Chalmers, the architect of the statute, 
explained that s.17 was included because “the special sections which follow [ss.18-
20] are not exhaustive”.62 This view that s.17 refers to the pre-contractual period is 
further supported by the insertion of the word “based” rather than simply referring to 
“a contract of utmost good faith”, by the section being placed in that part of the statute 
headed “Disclosure and Representations”, and by the reference to “either party” in 
s.17 which remedies the omission of the insurer in ss.18-20. Yet, this is a case of what 
might have been and should delay us no further because, whatever Chalmers’ 
intention, the idea that s.17 only refers to the pre-contractual obligation, in the words 
                                                 
60 [2005] EWCA Civ 112; [2005] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 445. See J. Lowry and P. Rawlings, 
“Fraudulent Claims: Framing the Appropriate Remedy” [2006] J.B.L. 339. 
61 Notwithstanding the title of the 1906 Act, the provision applies to all insurance contracts: Pan 
Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501 at 518; [1994] 3 W.L.R. 
677. 
62 Sir Mackenzie D. Chalmers and D. Owen, The Marine Insurance Act, 1906 (London: W. Clowes, 
1907) at 25. 
of Lord Clyde, “now appears past praying for.”63 It might be added that, as a result of 
this broad view of the meaning of s.17, it is probably past praying that the fraudulent 
claim rule is part of s.17, even though it is difficult to think of a more egregious form 
of bad faith.  
 
Some judges have taken the view that s.17 created a continuing duty of utmost 
good faith.64 This certainly appears to form the basis of Hirst J.’s reasoning in The 
Litsion Pride.65 However, the case was not about fraud. Rather, it concerned a term in 
a marine policy that required notice to the insurer when the insured ship entered a war 
zone. Since notification gave rise to an additional premium and also since it could be 
given after entering the zone, there was a temptation on insureds to give notice only if 
a loss was sustained. Curiously, The judge took the view that the shipowner, although 
not in breach of contract by failing to notify, had not acted in good faith as required 
by s.17. The attempt by the shipowner to deprive the insurer of the premium was a 
breach of what the judge believed was a continuing duty of utmost good faith and this 
entitled the insurer to avoid the policy ab initio. The notion that good faith operates 
post-contractually also found favour with the majority in Orakpo v Barclays 
Insurance Services,66 but the discussion of the scope of s.17 was obiter because the 
policy was voidable for material misrepresentation. Moreover, in argument before the 
court it seems to have been assumed that the duty of good faith was implied into 
insurance policies. In any event, Hoffmann L.J. remarked, in terms that echoed Lord 
Mansfield’s reasoning on the pre-contractual duty in Carter v Boehm:67 
 
“I do not see why the duty of good faith on the part of the assured should 
expire when the contract has been made. The reasons for requiring good faith 
continue to exist. Just as the nature of the risk will usually be within the 
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peculiar knowledge of the insured, so will the circumstances of the casualty; it 
will rarely be within the knowledge of the insurance company. I think that the 
insurance company should be able to trust the assured to put forward a claim 
in good faith. Any fraud in making the claim goes to the root of the contract 
and entitles the insurer to be discharged.”68  
 
He added, “I think it should discharge the insurer from all liability.”69 This leaves 
unclear whether the contract is voidable or the insurer merely has the right to 
terminate. Sir Roger Parker seemed clearer on the point because he saw no distinction 
between a material non-disclosure or misrepresentation at the inception of the policy 
and a fraud in making a claim.  
 
Allowing the insurer to recover any genuine payments relating to earlier losses 
seems harsh. The justification for avoidance where there is a misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure in the pre-contractual period is that the risk, which is fundamental to 
the policy, was other than that agreed to by the insurer; but while a fraud at the claims 
stage may undermine the future relationship between the parties, it is hard to see how 
it can be said to have affected their past (prior to the fraud) relationship or 
undermined the foundation of the contract. A series of cases have attacked the broad 
view of s.17 taken in The Litsion Pride and Orakpo, and any suggestion that it gives 
rise to a duty to disclose facts post-contract similar to that which arises before the 
contract has been firmly dismissed.70 For example, in Royal Boskalis Westminster NV 
v Mountain,71 the insured suppressed documents, but there was no allegation of fraud 
and so the insurer sought to argue that, following The Litsion Pride, there had been a 
culpable misrepresentation or failure to disclose. Rix J. rejected Hirst J.’s view of the 
post-contractual duty of good faith, pointing out that: “[a]part from The Litsion Pride 
itself, there is no authority which holds that the post-contractual duty of good faith 
goes wider in the claims context than a duty not to make fraudulent claims”.72 He 
added that recent cases “have shown that there is concern about the width of the 
principle coupled with the strength of the remedy of avoidance laid down in s. 17 of 
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the Act”.73 Similarly, in the Scottish decision of Fargnoli v GA Bonus Plc,74 Lord 
Penrose observed that, while fraudulent concealment in the pre-contractual period 
undermined consent and, therefore, there was little difficulty in deciding that there 
was no contract, fraud in making a claim does not overturn the fact that up to that 
point there was a binding contract: “To avoid the policy ab initio would defeat that 
reality.”75 In Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon),76 Mance L.J. did not conceal his dislike 
of the draconian consequences of s.17. He confirmed that the fraudulent claim rule 
arose from the common law rather than the contract and fell “outside the scope of 
section 17”,77 so that provision could not be used to avoid the policy ab initio. He 
added that under the fraudulent claim rule the entire claim was forfeited and, 
therefore, since this included any genuine part of that claim it was obviously no part 
of the rule that the fraud must be shown to have been material, whereas s.17 rests on a 
test of materiality analogous to that which applies to pre-contractual disclosure.78 
 
The principal conclusion of the House of Lords The Star Sea79 was that any 
duty of good faith ceased on the commencement of litigation because from that time 
the relationship between the parties was governed no longer by the contract but by the 
Civil Procedure Rules, which contain disclosure provisions. Lord Hobhouse of 
Woodborough, however, also considered s.17. He thought Hirst J.’s view “should not 
any longer be treated as a sound statement of the law. In so far as it decouples the 
obligation of good faith both from s.17 and the remedy of avoidance and from the 
contractual principles which would apply to a breach of contract it is clearly 
unsound.”80 Lord Hobhouse restricted the scope of s.17 – indeed, he came close to 
restricting it out of existence. He made evident his dislike of the remedy of avoidance: 
“[f]or the defendants successfully to invoke section 17 so as to avoid the policy ab 
initio and wholly defeat the claim would be totally out of proportion to the failure of 
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which they were complaining.”81 It was “of disproportionate benefit” to the insurer, 
enabling them to “to escape retrospectively the liability to indemnify which he has 
previously and… validly undertaken.”82 He also noted the criticism of the pre-
contractual duty and cautioned against its extension to the post-contractual stage by 
use of s.17. In relation to fraudulent claims, he did not dispute the insurer’s 
entitlement to be discharged from future liability because, “[t]he fraud is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the bargain and the continuation of the contractual 
relationship between the insurer and the assured.”83 But he emphasised that “whether 
the making of a fraudulent claim would entitle the insurer to avoid the contract ab 
initio, is a point upon which the judgments in the Orakpo case cannot be treated as 
fully authoritative”.84 This led to his conclusion that there was a distinction between 
the fraudulent claim rule and the duty in s.17.  
 
Lord Scott of Foscote said in The Star Sea, “the content of the duty of good 
faith owed by an assured post-contract is not the same as the duty owed in the pre-
contract stage. So what is the content of the duty owed at the claim stage? It is, at 
least, that of honesty in the presentation of a claim”.85 Longmore L.J. tackled the issue 
at greater length in The Mercandian Continent,86 which involved a forged letter 
provided to the insurers by the insured to assist in the defence of a claim brought by a 
third party. He said: 
“there was a continuing duty on the assured to refrain from a deliberate act or 
omission intended to deceive the insurer through either positive 
misrepresentation or concealment of material facts and facts would only be 
material for the purpose if they had ultimate legal relevance to a defence under 
the policy… [T]he insurers cannot avoid the contract of insurance for such 
fraudulent conduct unless the conduct was such as to justify their terminating 
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the contract in any event… [I]t seems to me that the duty not to be materially 
fraudulent does continue at all times after the contract has been made.”87 
 
Alternatively, if there were only defined categories of post-contractual good faith 
rather than a general duty: 
 
“the giving of information, pursuant to an express or implied obligation to do 
so in the contract of insurance, is an occasion when good faith should be 
exercised. Since, however, the giving of information is essentially an 
obligation stemming from contract, the remedy for the insured fraudulently 
misinforming the insurer must be commensurate with the insurer’s remedies 
for breach of contract. The insurer will not, therefore, be able to avoid the 
contract of insurance with retrospective effect unless he can show that the 
fraud was relevant to his ultimate liability under the policy and was such as 
would entitle him to terminate the insurance contract.” 88 
 
 The continuing duty of good faith – such as it is – may be overridden by 
conflicting contractual terms, in which event any remedy is for breach of contract.89 
Professor Merkin has advanced the interesting idea that the role of this duty “is not as 
a free-standing obligation which gives rise to its own remedies, but rather as a factor 
which colours the contractual obligations of the assured”, and as such it could allow 
the courts to imply terms in a rather broader set of circumstances than in the general 
law of contract.90 This seems more feasible in light of changes to s.17 contained – as 
will be seen – in the Insurance Act 2015. 
 
The Versloot Dredging case 
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In Versloot Dredging BV v HDI-Gerling Industrie Versicherung, (The DC 
Merwestone),91 the Court of Appeal emphatically rejected criticisms of the fraudulent 
claims rule. This case concerned flooding that occurred near the bow of the vessel DC 
Merwestone and resulted in major damage to the main engine, which was located 
towards the stern. The assured claimed on its Hull and Machinery policy for the cost 
of replacing the engine, some 3.2 million euros.  As part of the casualty investigation 
process, the underwriters asked for an explanation of the ingress of water, its spread 
from the bow of the vessel to the engine room and why it was not controlled by using 
the ship’s pumps. In answer, the assured’s General Manager falsely claimed in a letter 
that the bilge alarm had gone off at around noon on the day of the incident, but that, 
according to the Master or crew, it had been ignored because it was attributed to the 
rolling of the vessel due to heavy weather, and that he had been informed of these 
facts by the ship’s Master. In fact, the crew had not heard or, indeed, reported an 
alarm going off at that time and had, therefore, never given an explanation for not 
investigating it.  
 
At first instance,92 Popplewell J. observed that, while the fraudulent claim rule 
has long been settled as a fundamental principle of insurance contract law,93 the 
fraudulent device rule originated in the dicta in Agapitos v Agnew,94 (for which he had 
argued as counsel in that case) and it was with “manifest reluctance”95 that he felt 
obliged to apply this dicta because the General Manager’s letter was a fraudulent 
device since it “was intended by him to promote the claim in the hope of a prompt 
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settlement”.96 Popplewell J., therefore, upheld the insurers’ refusal of the claim. He 
did, however, take the opportunity to voice strong criticism of the rule, or it least its 
all-or-nothing effect, arguing that on “a scale of culpability which may attach to 
fraudulent conduct relating to the making of claims, this was at the low end. It was a 
reckless untruth, not a carefully planned deceit”,97 it was told on only one occasion 
and had not been continued at the trial. To be deprived of a valid claim amounting to 
more than 3.2 million euros as a result “is, in my view, a disproportionately harsh 
sanction.”98 Had he felt free of authority, he would have developed principles quite 
different from those advanced by Mance L.J.: 
 
“My own view would be that if the law is to extend the draconian effect of an 
anomalous rule, applicable only to insurance claims, and then only prior to the 
commencement of litigation, to striking down wholly valid claims, the policy of 
the law should be to require at least a sufficiently close connection between the 
fraudulent device and the valid claim to make it just and proportionate that the 
valid claim should be forfeit. The law does not provide in this context that the 
end always justifies the means; but nor should it say that any dishonest means 
which are more than de minimis should deprive a litigant of his just ends. What 
will be just and proportionate will depend upon the circumstances of each case, 
which may vary considerably.”99 
 
He also pointed out that: 
 
“whilst any fraud is reprehensible and is to be discouraged, it is not normally 
the function of the civil law to provide such deterrence. The fraudulent claims 
rule in insurance is a form of penal non-damages which, so far as I am aware, 
has no parallel elsewhere in the common law. Yet deliberate exaggeration of 
claims, for example in the context of personal injuries, occurs regularly and 
does not attract the sanction of loss of that part of the claim which is valid.”100 
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He favoured a materiality test allowing the court to consider “whether it was just and 
proportionate to deprive the assured of his substantive rights, taking into account all 
the circumstances of the case.”101 
 
This attack stood out because it came after various cases in which the extension 
of the fraudulent claim rule to fraudulent devices by Mance L.J. had been assumed to 
be correct; but, fired by the possibility of getting the rule amended, the owners 
brought an appeal. It failed. The Court of Appeal agreed with Popplewell J.’s refusal 
of the claim, but declined to endorse his criticisms of the rule and fell back on familiar 
ideas. Clarke L.J. stated that the fraudulent claim rule was “designedly draconian”.102  
 
“It functions as a deterrent to the deception of insurers who, in the nature of 
things, will have no, or very little, knowledge of the incident which is said to 
give rise to the claim. Part of the rationale is that if lying to the insurers did not 
attract that sanction, the dishonest insured would enjoy a one way bet… [I]f the 
lie was never found out, the insurers might end up paying out… If the insured 
was found out there would be no effective sanction (at any rate where the claim 
did not come to litigation where costs penalties might apply). He would still 
recover the true value of his claim.”103 
 
He concluded that the rule was that:  
 
“(a) the fraudulent device must be directly related to the claim, (b) the 
fraudulent device must have been intended by the insured to promote his 
prospect of success, and (c) the fraudulent device must have tended to 
yield a not insignificant improvement in the insured's prospects of success 
prior to any final determination of the parties' rights.”104  
 
His only doubt concerned the third part and on this he was not prepared to express a 
clear view as to whether the test should be objective or subjective because it would 
have made no difference on the facts. He was unsure of the reason for its negative 
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formulation and suggested instead that the device must be shown to have tended to 
yield “a significant improvement in the insured's prospects.”105 
 
Clarke L.J. also felt bound by earlier case law which, although not strictly 
binding, he regarded as authoritative. He took the view that the extension by Mance 
L.J. of the fraudulent claim rule to fraudulent devices had been approved by the 
Supreme Court in Summers v Fairclough Homes,106 and applied by the Privy Council 
in Stemson v AMP General Insurance (NZ) Ltd,107 although the statements in the 
Supreme Court were dicta, and in the case before the Privy Council, Lord Mance was 
the only judge to raise the issue. Nevertheless, as Clarke L.J. pointed out, various first 
instance decisions, such as The Game Boy,108 a further Privy Council decision in 
Beacon Insurance Co. Ltd v Maharaj Bookstore Ltd,109 - to which list can be added, 
since Versloot Dredging, Savash v CIS General Insurance Ltd110 - have applied or 
endorsed the dicta. Moreover, he returned to the underlying public policy interest in 
deterring fraud as the principal justification for applying the fraudulent claims rule to 
fraudulent devices. 
 
“The harshness of the result of a fraudulent devices rule is most apparent 
when, as here, the Court has, in the end, determined that the claim is otherwise 
valid. But the rule is directed to an earlier stage. Fraudulent devices, as their 
definition shows, are used by those who think their use desirable in order to 
bolster a claim which appears to have potential weaknesses (e.g. as here 
Owners' possible responsibility for a deficiency in the bilge alarm system) and 
to avoid or cut short lines of inquiry or investigation which might prevent or 
postpone the payment of it. At the stage when they are used it will probably 
not be possible to tell whether the claim is one that will in the end be accepted, 
or held, to be valid. The risk to the insurer is that the device may achieve its 
purpose, so that the insurer fails to explore the claim properly and pays out in 
respect of a claim where he may have a defence. If he does do so it will never 
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be known whether, had he not done so, the result would have been the 
same.”111 
 
Clarke L.J. did not endorse the idea of proportionality to which Popplewell J. 
had been attracted because it has never been suggested with regard to fraudulent 
claims or fraudulent devices, but principally because of his view of the public interest 
in deterring fraud. Holding out the possibility that insureds might recover part of a 
claim in spite of fraud might encourage fraud, and in any event he was unclear how 
the effect of fraud on the claim would be calculated (although FOS has managed). He 
rejected the idea that the fraudulent claims rule breached the Human Rights Act 1998, 
and, in particular, Article 1 of the First Protocol, which concerns the deprivation of a 
person’s property. He decided that was overridden by public policy, the fraudulent 
claim rule was proportionate to the objective sought, and the sanction was not 
penal,112 since a condition of indemnity was honesty.  
 
Express terms 
Insurance policies commonly include terms dealing with fraud, although these do not 
necessarily remove the difficulties associated with the fraudulent claim rule. A typical 
clause provides: “If any claim upon this Policy shall be in any respect fraudulent or if 
fraudulent means or devices be used by or on behalf of the insured to obtain any 
benefit under the Policy … all benefit under this Policy shall be forfeited”.113 The 
intention of the insurer in including a clause like this may merely be to bring to the 
policyholder’s attention the fraudulent claim rule, and, indeed, the courts typically 
regard them in this light.114 Thus, in Fargnoli v GA Bonus plc,115 a decision of the 
Outer House of the Court of Session, Lord Penrose thought such a clause ambiguous 
and ruled that it only relieved the insurer of liability for the tainted claim and did not 
allow avoidance ab initio. But, of course, clear wording may alter the scope of the 
clause and the remedies available.116 An example is:  
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 “We will at our option avoid the policy from the inception of this insurance or 
from the date of the claim or alleged claim or avoid the claim (a) if a claim 
made by you or anyone acting on your behalf to obtain a policy benefit is 
fraudulent or intentionally exaggerated, whether ultimately material or not or 
(b) a false declaration or statement is made or fraudulent device put forward in 
support of a claim.”117 
 
This would seem to allow the insurer not only to refuse the claim tainted by fraud but 
also to demand reimbursement of earlier payments made under the policy in respect 
of claims unaffected by the fraud, although a court might seek to avoid this draconian 
consequence.  
 
Because the fraudulent claim rule is a rule of law it seems doubtful that terms 
reiterating that rule are subject to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999,118 but the regulations should apply where the clause in a consumer 
policy goes beyond the common law. In the case of damage covered by compulsory 
motor insurance, the insurer will be liable even if the policy has been avoided.119 A 
consumer insured might be able to complain to FOS where such a clause is used to 
deny a claim. In the unlikely that the policy purports to exclude remedies for fraud, 
such exclusion would probably be ineffective,120 which means that a clause can only 
restate the common law rule or extend the remedies available. 
 
REFORM 
As noted, the Law Commissions faced the same conundrum that had exercised 
Popplewell J. in the Versloot Dredging case: 
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 “It is important for the law to set out clear sanctions to deter policyholders 
from acting fraudulently. Although insurance fraud is a criminal offence, 
prosecutions are relatively rare, meaning that the civil law has an important 
part to play in deterring fraud. It should also grant remedies to insurers which 
are principled, proportionate and reliable. However, the current law on the 
effect of a fraudulent claim is convoluted and confused. There is tension 
between the common law rule that the fraudster forfeits the fraudulent claim, 
and a statutory rule which allows the insurer to avoid the whole contract from 
the outset if the insured breaches the duty of good faith.” 
 
In the end, however, the Law Commissions decided only on limited measures 
because, “Our view is that this element of the law is best left to the courts to develop, 
and that it does not require statutory reform.”121 This is not surprising since they 
started from the same characterisation of the problem as the civil courts, namely, the 
vulnerability of the insurers to fraud and the size of the problem.122 Although 
acknowledging that the identification of fraud is not always straightforward, the 
principal difficulties were regarded as arising from the nature of the issue, which, 
because it involves a variety of behaviours, makes it difficult to be precise and, 
therefore, hard to reduce to a code. They rejected the idea of a statutory threshold – 
for example, that the penalties should be triggered only if some specified amount or 
proportion of the claim were fraudulent. Similarly, they did not favour the idea that 
the courts be given discretion over the remedy to apply where a fraudulent device had 
been used. The Law Commissions did look at Australia where discretion has been 
conferred on the courts. Under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984, s.56(1), the general 
principle remains that the insurer can refuse payment of a fraudulent claim, but s. 
56(2) goes on to say, “if only a minimal or insignificant part of the claim is made 
fraudulently and non-payment of the remainder of the claim would be harsh and 
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unfair”, the court may order such payment as is “just and equitable in the 
circumstances”, although in exercising this discretion “the court shall have regard to 
the need to deter fraudulent conduct in relation to insurance but may also have regard 
to any other relevant matter” (s. 56(3)). In practice, the Australian courts appear to 
have limited their use of this discretion to situations where the part tainted by fraud is 
separable from the remainder of the claim. The Law Commissions rejected this 
approach because of concern that it might encourage minor frauds,123 and, instead,  
endorsed the idea of forfeiture of the entire claim, in spite of concern about the lack of 
proportionality and some resistance, particularly from a group of Commercial Court 
judges, who highlighted the curiosity of having “a policy of penal non-damages” that 
only applied to insurance law.124 The issue was raised again during the passage of the 
Insurance Bill through the House of Lords, but the weight of opinion was in favour of 
the Law Commissions’ position of not legislating and leaving the development of the 
law, including any distinction between fraudulent claims and fraudulent devices, to 
the courts.125 Significantly, perhaps, tort law is being moved closer to the fraudulent 
claim rule. The Criminal Justice and Courts Act, s.57, will oblige the courts to dismiss 
a genuine claim for damages where the claimant “has been fundamentally dishonest 
in relation to the primary claim or a related claim” (s.57(1)(b)). But this is not an 
absolute rule – as it is in insurance – because the court has a discretion where it “is 
satisfied that the claimant would suffer substantial injustice if the claim were 
dismissed” (s.57(2)). 
 
The Law Commissions’ views meant that the Insurance Act 2015 includes just 
two sections on fraudulent claims. Section 12(1) states that if the insured makes a 
fraudulent claim the insurer is not liable to pay, may recover any sums already paid in 
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relation to that claim and may by notice to the insured treat the contract as terminated 
with effect from the time of the fraudulent act. Section 12(2)(a) provides that 
termination allows the insurer to refuse claims (fraudulent or not) brought after the 
fraudulent act, even if made before notification of the decision to terminate and 
unconnected with the fraud, and any premium need not be returned (s.12(2)(b)). On 
the other hand, claims relating to events prior to, and unconnected with, the fraudulent 
act are not affected (s.12(3)). Section 13 clarifies the effect of fraud in group 
insurance and, in essence, means that the rights of the insurer under s.12 are 
exercisable only against the person who made the fraudulent claim. These changes 
raise some issues. First, the use of a fraudulent device is not mentioned but would 
presumably be covered by the courts continuing to adopt a broad definition of the 
term “fraudulent claim” to include genuine claims advanced by the use of a fraudulent 
device, since this has always been regarded as a sub-species of the principal rule and 
not a separate rule. Second, s.12 starts by referring to the remedies where the insured 
makes a “fraudulent claim”, but then states that the key point is “the time of the 
fraudulent act”. Presumably, the claim and the act are meant to be synonymous so that 
the making of the fraudulent claim is the fraudulent act and vice versa. It seems 
unlikely that a court would see some significance in the choice of different words, 
and, for example, conclude that the writing of the forged receipt is taken to be the act, 
even before it is used to support a claim.  
 
The other reform concerns s.17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. It was 
accepted that this section could not be abolished because it places a pre-contractual 
duty of disclosure (or, under the act, a duty of fair presentation of the risk) on the 
insurer, and because it may have useful post-contractual functions unconnected with 
fraudulent claims.126 The Law Commissions accepted that the best way forward was 
to remove the penalty of avoidance because this would give the courts a freer range to 
apply the duty of good faith to post-contractual issues. The section, as amended, now 
reads, “A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good 
faith.” The Law Commissions left the word “utmost” simply because of uncertainty as 
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to whether it made any difference, and, perhaps, if it had been deleted this might have 
been construed as a deliberate break with earlier case law. 
 
Other proposals, which the Law Commissions contemplated, were dropped. 
The idea that insurers should have a statutory right to recover the costs of an 
investigation where the claim was fraudulent was omitted because of practical 
difficulties in assessing these costs. These might not have presented a real problem for 
the courts, which have enormous experience in such matters, but in the end it was 
perhaps more significant that there seemed little demand from the insurers for such a 
remedy. 
 
RECHARACTERISING THE ISSUES? 
The chief justification given for the fraudulent claim rule is the assertion that it deters 
fraud, and this is regarded as particularly important because prosecutions are rare. The 
idea that the civil law should remedy the defects of the criminal law and the criminal 
justice system seems curious when it is normally concerned with compensating loss 
arising from a breach of a duty rather than the very different objective of inflicting 
punishment as a deterrent.127 Moreover, there is no empirical data to show that the 
fraudulent claim rule does deter, and a growing literature throws serious doubts on the 
effectiveness of non-criminal (and even criminal) sanctions in deterring behaviour.128 
Leaving these issues aside, it is hard to see why insurance companies should enjoy 
special protection when similar difficulties in identifying and preventing fraud arise in 
relation to other types of claim. Of course, that special protection is only partial 
because it does not apply to third parties claiming directly from a liability insurer, 
although that has led the industry to press the Government for action, particularly in 
relation to fraudulent motor accident claims, and, among other things, prompted the 
reforms in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. 
 
The need for these unusual measures rests on the apparently serious nature of 
the problem. The ABI has stated that, “Every hour of every day 15 fraudulent 
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insurance claims are exposed in the UK. Insurance fraud… is a serious criminal 
offence that affects every honest insurance customer, adding an extra £50 a year to 
their premiums.”129 As noted above, this assertion is based on figures purportedly 
showing that insurers detected 118,500 fraudulent claims worth £1.3bn in 2012, and, 
it will be recalled, recently the Insurance Fraud Bureau has stated that undetected 
general insurance fraud has reached an annual amount of £2.1bn.130 Yet, these figures 
seem hard to reconcile with other statistics. In 2013-14, the National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau recorded that 8,583 offences involving insurance fraud were 
reported in the year ending September 2014.131 Criminal statistics are notoriously 
difficult to read and comparisons are hard to make, in part because people do not 
report all crimes and the police fail to record all those crimes that are reported. 
Nevertheless, the contrast is surprising and suggests that the industry’s figures largely 
comprise cases where the relevant insurer believed there was fraud but did not report 
it to the police. This seems curious since insurers would appear to have little reason 
not to report, and, indeed, a report would reinforce a decision not to pay a claim. The 
implication is that the suspicions of fraud are not supported by sufficient evidence, 
although the view that no crime has occurred does not mean the claimant would 
succeed in making the claim because of the difference in the standard of proof. There 
may be some circularity here in that the insurer’s behaviour in treating claims with 
suspicion is legitimised and, indeed, encouraged by assertions about the prevalence of 
fraud, which come from the industry. All of which brings to mind a criticism made by 
FOS more than a decade ago about insurers refusing claims on the basis of their  
employees’ personal opinion as to the claimant’s bad faith without sufficient proof of 
dishonesty, and how insurers are “surprised that fraud must be established to a high 
degree of probability.”132 FOS urged insurers to recognise that people make mistakes, 
particularly since “insurers are not always clear in what they are asking the consumer  
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to tell them.”133 The judges are not unaware of these criticisms and a few have even 
attacked the absolute nature of the remedy, even while, like Popplewell J. in Versloot, 
they ultimately disallow a claim. The courts have always recognised that exaggerated 
claims may not be fraudulent but may constitute acceptable negotiating tactics, and 
some have acknowledged that these tactics may be rendered necessary by the 
intransigence of insurers in paying legitimate claims, as one judge remarked recently 
when dismissing an allegation of fraud, “This is… a claim in which the Claimants 
clearly feel very disappointed by the insurers response to their claim and were seeking 
to put their claim with as much vigour as they reasonably could.”134 
 
The idea that insurance fraud is rife appeared to have been reinforced by the 
ABI’s consumer survey in 2012 which reported that 42 per cent of respondents “felt 
that insurance fraud was an easy way to make a quick buck” and 27 per cent thought 
the penalty was negligible.135 But consumers reporting their views as to the ease with 
which fraud can be undertaken says nothing about the prevalence of the crime or even 
the likelihood that those who expressed this view would commit fraud. These may be 
people who simply think that is how others might behave. The survey results may cast 
doubt on the effectiveness of the fraudulent claim rule in conveying a message about 
deterrence, since it suggests people are unaware of the rule or unconvinced as to its 
likely success. While this might encourage stiffer penalties rather than any relaxation, 
it may indicate that such a rule is not going to work. This is not the place for a more 
thorough analysis of all the figures or the deterrent effect of the fraudulent claim rule, 
although it is worth reiterating that these issues are important because they are 
routinely used as the unchallengeable starting point for media stories, official 
inquiries and Government statements on fraud and, therefore, provide the foundation 
on which policy is built. 
 
One feature of the recent discussion is the way the honest policyholder is 
presented as the beneficiary of the rule’s supposed deterrent effect and of tougher 
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action on fraud. Speaking to the Association of British Insurers in 2014, Chris 
Grayling, the Justice Minister, said, “It is not right that people who cheat the system 
should get away with it and force up the price of motor insurance for honest, 
hardworking motorists.”136 In welcoming the minister’s announcement of an insurance 
taskforce to look into fraud, the ABI declared, “the insurance industry is committed to 
reducing insurance fraud to protect honest customers”.137 If one assumes, first, that 
substantial amounts are paid out to fraudulent claimants, and if one also assumes that 
were these claims not paid insurers would reduce premiums (rather than, say, increase 
dividend payments), then, of course, there could be great benefit to policyholders in 
tackling fraud. A cynic might not rush to make either of these assumptions. In any 
event, the focus on fraud may be drawing discussion away from issues that are of 
more concern to policyholders, namely, the conduct of insurers in their treatment of 
claims. Do some insurers pressure claimants into accepting a lower offer by excessive 
delays in dealing with claims?138 Where are the figures on legitimate claims refused 
by insurers? They may be difficult to estimate, but that has not stopped annual figures 
on fraud. Presumably, the insurers, who are the only possible source for such data, 
have no interest in undertaking the calculation. This certainly seems an area of 
concern: in 2013-14 of the complaints to FOS about insurance (other than ppi), 52 per 
cent related to claims.139 It might be suggested that these are different issues, but that 
depends on your viewpoint. The “hardworking” policyholder, whose legitimate claim 
is rejected, might regard the insurer’s refusal as fraudulent, whether or not this 
coincides with the law’s view. And the familiar tactic by which an insurer makes an 
offer lower than the loss in the hope that the insured will accept might seem like the 
mirror image of an action that if taken by an insured would be fraudulent.  
 
The fraudulent device rule may have exacerbated the policyholders’ problems. 
In spite of the justifications for this rule, which were most recently repeated in 
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Versloot Dredging,140 is it really too far fetched to suggest that most people would 
draw a distinction between an entirely fraudulent claim and one that is genuine but 
supported by forged evidence? Might not the insured feel justified (and not dishonest) 
in forging evidence when the insurer insists on a receipt that cannot reasonably be 
produced?141 It is difficult to assess whether the development of the law on fraudulent 
devices may have encouraged insurers to increase the demands for evidence in the 
hope of being able to deny the claim, terminate the policy and retain the premium, 
but, as has been seen, insurers may apply a definition of fraud that does not precisely 
reflect its legal meaning. FOS has certainly taken a slightly different view. As early as 
2002 it was critical of the “overzealous” practices of insurers in insisting on receipts, 
which “may put customers in a position where they may be tempted to create 
substitutes for lost receipts”.142 Payment was ordered by FOS in one case where the 
insured “had been foolish to obtain a forged receipt but he was not dishonestly trying 
to obtain something to which he was not entitled.”143 In a more extreme case from 
2011, an insurer refused a claim for stolen jewellery because the policyholder had not 
provided “sufficient evidence to prove ownership”, even though he explained that 
receipts could not be produced because some of the items had been bought many 
years before and others had been received as gifts, and he supplied valuations 
obtained previously along with family photographs in which his wife was wearing the 
items. FOS found for the policyholder, pointing out “that it was not unusual for 
people to be unable to produce a receipt for every single possession stolen in a 
burglary.”144  
 
Of course, such cases do not indicate general practice, and it is difficult for 
insurers to prove fraud, although the fraudulent device rule has opened opportunities 
for them to press their suspicions and in other cases those suspicions may have led 
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them to pursue alternative strategies, such as refusing a claim for breach of a warranty 
or condition precedent, or avoiding the policy for breach of the duty of disclosure or 
misrepresentation or even lack of insurable interest.145 Yet, insurers certainly would 
not recognise any characterisation of themselves as puppeteers able to control the 
direction of a debate and make the Government and the courts dance to their tune – 
the impositions of Solvency II indicate otherwise. But they are better able to organise 
than policyholders, and, while more Government and Parliamentary attention is being 
given to fraud (particularly in motor insurance), the provision in the Insurance Bill 
allowing policyholders damages for late payment of claims was dropped in the face of 
opposition from parts of the industry (admittedly, much of the industry saw no reason 
for such opposition) as was an earlier proposal to protect innocent joint 
policyholders.146 Resolving the problems associated with claims requires a broader 
understanding of all sides of the issue. This means looking at the interests of the 
insurer, which needs protection from fraud, and the policyholder, who wants a claim 
paid. It does not help the industry if customers believe, rightly or wrongly, that 
insurers are looking for ways to avoid payment or are viewing every claim as 
fraudulent.  
 
It would be foolish to deny that fraudulent claims present a problem or that 
insurers face difficulties in proving fraud, but it would be helpful to have better – or, 
at least, more transparent – statistics. It might also be useful to consider why fraud 
occurs because it may not be a simple matter of greed and deception by policyholders 
and third parties that can be deterred with severe penalties, but may be bound up with 
feelings of injustice among policyholders about their treatment by insurers. If the 
starting position is that fraud is the problem, this will naturally colour the debate and 
the processing of claims, making insurers more cautious and policyholders with 
legitimate claims more pessimistic about the likelihood of getting paid. Noise made 
about fraud may be justified, but it should not conceal the difficulties faced by 
legitimate claimants.  
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